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LEGITIMATE VIOLENCE IN ILLEGITIMATE TIMES: DIO’S 
THEORIES OF LEGITIMACY 
A L Beek (North-West University) 
Comparing legitimacy in the three different contexts of literary 
leisteia, Late Republican civil war actors, and contemporary Severan 
emperors reveals Dio to be consistent when discussing legitimate 
violence. In all three, Dio presents establishing legitimacy as a 
primary factor in attaining power.  As the required skills to achieve 
power differed from those for ruling, the resulting ruler could be 
disastrous. Through employing the ‘noble bandit’ topos, Dio 
questions the emperors’ suitability, comparing them to bandits. 
Overall, Dio interprets Late Republican history differently from his 
sources for Republican history. In his view, future statesmen cannot 
rely upon the mos maiorum.  
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In the later books of Dio’s Roman History, Dio questions the legitimacy of the 
Roman emperors at several points. While Dio is no opponent of monarchy, he does 
believe that the system tends to select the wrong figures to be in charge. A further 
examination of the early fragments of his history suggests he does not believe this 
to be anomalous; instead, the same mechanics appear in the civil wars of the Late 
Republic, where legitimacy is a prime consideration. In the early books of his 
work, Dio answers questions of legitimacy in civil war and returns to these 
questions again regarding the Severan dynasty.1 
Moreover, in questioning the legitimacy of the leaders of the state, Dio 
employs the ‘noble bandit’ topos, akin to figures seen in Plutarch and Sallust, inter 
alia.2 While others might well take state authority to be ipso facto a legitimate use 
of power, Dio, I believe, desires to question this assumption: while still putting the 
Severans in charge and able to defeat bandits and other imperial contenders, he 
nevertheless questions their suitability by comparing their activities to those of 
bandits. 
                                                   
1  I would like to thank Carsten Hjort Lange and Andrew Scott for their comments on 
earlier versions of this piece and their willingness to share numerous works-in-progress 
with me.  I would also like to thank Nicholas Allen for his comments on the present 
version of this piece.  Longer translations of Dio are taken from the Cary Loeb volumes 
of Dio, translations of shorter passages of Dio and passages from other authors are my 
own.   
2  For this motif of the ‘edlen Räubern’ in Roman historiography more generally, see 
Grünewald 1999:94, and 2004:5, 65. 
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Dio remains an excellence source for the third century CE.3 On the one 
hand, he was an eyewitness or at least a contemporary observer for the last books 
of his Roman history. Yet he was not the only observer of his day; there were other 
sources, such as the writings of Herodian (extant) and the autobiography of 
Septimius Severus (not extant). Much has been made of his usage of Augustus and 
comparison of Augustus as a model to the later emperors. His nostalgia for 
Augustus (and to a degree, Marcus Aurelius) as ideal monarchs is neither new nor 
unexpected. This discussion, however useful, side-lines the impact of the early 
books of the history, those covering the civil wars, and it is in these books, I argue, 
that Dio arrives at his assumptions about what comprises legitimate and 
illegitimate authority and behaviour, assumptions to which later he returns in his 
portraits of the emperors, particularly the Severans.4 
This article steps away from questions of imperial power and senatorial 
approval (as interesting as they are) to refocus instead upon a question of what 
precisely is legitimate and illegitimate authority. Dio presents this ‘questionably 
legitimate’ authority as effective but nevertheless undesirable. To Dio’s eye, what 
is good and bad has lost ground to what works and what does not. In this way, Dio 
simultaneously concedes effectiveness to actions he disapproves. And in his view, 
the Roman glorification of the mos maiorum leads precisely to this problem — 
finding solutions in the mos maiorum are finding solutions of effectiveness, not 
necessarily solutions of rectitude. Accordingly, Dio implicitly argues that the mos 
maiorum championed in his historic predecessors (and to a lesser degree, in the 
Second Sophistic as well) simply does not work.5 
For better or for worse, Roman study of the mos maiorum generally rested 
more upon role models than stated principles.6 For while a speaker might appeal to 
                                                   
3  For bibliography and discussion on the estimation of Dio as historian, see Scott 2018:1; 
Lange & Madsen 2016 passim, esp. the contributions of Schulz and Westall; and 
numerous contributions in Fromentin et al. 2016:271-414.  For the impact of Severus on 
Dio, see Gleason 2011:37. 
4  For the impact of the idealised Augustus and Aurelius as well as the famous debate of 
Maecenas in book 52, see most recently Scott 2018:6-7; Ando 2016:570-572; Carsana 
2016; Coltelloni-Trannoy 2016; Kemezis 2014:126-139. That debate will not be covered 
in any great detail in this article, but still remains relevant in general terms.  
5  While other Greek authors, like Polybius and Plutarch, may have questioned the 
Romans’ faith in the mos maiorum, they generally accepted the Roman principle that the 
institutions of the Roman past had great merit. For the intellectual traditions of the mos 
maiorum, see Minyard 1985, with further bibliography.That Dio had been well-educated 
in the texts of the Latin-language historians is asserted early, at 1.1.2. See also Madsen 
2019:468; Scott 2018:15-16. 
6  Bell 2008, passim is useful here as an examination of ancient role models more 
generally. 
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ancestral Roman custom in general, the appeal was more effective when that claim 
was rooted in specific Roman leaders of the past — founder figures whose virtues 
had been burnished; their flaws somewhat forgotten over the years. These role 
models (and negative role models) commonly served to illustrate past ideals to 
look up to and attempt to emulate (as Plutarch explicitly acknowledges).7 It was 
not unusual for Roman authors to disagree about the precise nature of the mos 
maiorum.8  Dio, somewhat unusually for later Roman authors, often presents the 
wicked in the past, as if to pose in counterargument that in many ways, things have 
always been this bad.9 For moralising precepts, we generally must look more to the 
set speeches of Dio than the narration of events.10 In this way, Dio is markedly 
unlike a Thucydides, Xenophon, or Polybius, or even a Livy or Tacitus. However, 
Dio’s usage of bandit-episodes (leisteia), both in the early books and the later 
books, presents a parallel that reveals how Dio thinks about the legitimacy of 
violence, martial activity, and imperial rule. 
Violence, desertion, banditry and illegitimacy 
The Roman state controlled only some aspects of violence.11 The paterfamilias had 
retained extensive rights to inflict violence within the family, masters had power 
                                                   
7  For Plutarch’s writing of moral biography, see his statement of purpose at Alex. 1.2, but 
many examples can be found in the comparisons of his Lives, for example, see his 
comparison of Alcibiades and Coriolanus (Comp. Vit. Alc. et Cor. 1). 
8  See Drogula 2019:65-67 (inter alia) for variations on the mos maiorum, in this case, an 
examination of Cicero’s fight with Cato the Younger over Cato the Elder’s 
understanding of the mos maiorum.   
9  As one example, see Dio 37.57.3: καθαρῶς μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄνευ τινὸς ἰδίας πλεονεξίας 
οὐδεὶς τῶν τότε τὰ κοινὰ πλὴν τοῦ Κάτωνος ἔπραττεν ‘For no man of that day took part 
in public life from pure motives and free from any desire of personal gain except Cato’ 
(trans. Cary). See also Libourel 1974 (e.g. 384) for several assessments that Dio is more 
negative about Republican figures than other Roman historians, and Lange 2019:165-
166 for the assertion that Dio emphasizes rather than downplays violence during the 
Republic. 
10  See Millar 1964:78-79, esp. ‘[Dio uses] his speeches not to focus a particular political 
situation or a particular character, but to set forth the moral sentiments appropriate to the 
situation’. Here, the ‘not to focus on a particular character’ is of interest because this 
was, in other authors, a prime situation to display the merits of the speaker. See also Van 
Stekelenburg 1976:53. 
11  Two particular studies are worth mentioning here: Judy Gaughan’s 2010 arguments on 
much violence being permitted to the average Roman individual show that violence is 
generally permitted unless specifically prohibited, the reverse of assumptions today. 
Mabee (2009) shows to a sharp degree that violence was essentially a productive 
economic category, provided it was done under the correct authorities. On violence in 
Dio more generally, see also Libourel 1974, who argues that Dio depicts the Republic as 
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over the lives of slaves and the state gave significant authority to inflict corporal 
punishment upon its magistrates. On the other hand, popular riots were grudgingly 
seen as legitimate, if undesirable, forms of expressing disapproval.12 To engage in 
directed violent activity in public, one required justification, however. And as 
frustrating as it is to the modern scholar, that justification was less rooted in 
objective procedure than subjective consensus. Whether the person in question 
overstepped their authority to engage in violent activity was a matter of public 
opinion, and as the potency of the riots in Rome show, it was not a public opinion 
to flout lightly. As one example, Caesar’s attempt to triumph over Spain (that is, 
over Pompey’s sons) was not well received.13 
One of the unspoken provisions of the Late Republic (later spoken as a 
formal rule) was that generals were not supposed to formally win triumphs from 
civil war (though they frequently did). The loophole often used, however, was that 
one could give the war the appearance of being more foreign by triumphing over 
the non-Roman allies of one’s foes.14 As Florus quipped: Victores duces externum 
id magis quam civile bellum videri voluerunt, ut triumpharent. ‘The victorious 
leaders wished it to be seen as a foreign rather than a civil war, so that they might 
triumph’ (Flor. 3.22.9). For obvious reasons, therefore, the state allied to Rome had 
to assess civil wars cautiously. 
Abstention might bring a charge of disloyalty; choosing the wrong side 
might make one triumph-fodder. Dio shows that clearly in his description of 
Massilia, which repulsed Caesar during his war with Pompey (41.19), and in his 
description of the African kings shows Juba grudgingly siding with Pompey and 
Bocchus and Bogud with Caesar (41.42.7). 
                                                                                                                     
stereotypically violent, and Lange 2019 on the topics of internal violence, stasis, and 
civil war. 
12  See Kelly 2007 and to a lesser degree, Kelly 2013, for arguments that the populace was 
allowed to riot to show disapproval. Kelly argues that while the powers that be might try 
to restrain it, they did not typically try to retaliate. 
13  See Plut. Caes. 56.7-8. It is perhaps worth noting that most other sources do not record 
this public opprobrium while still holding disapproval themselves (e.g. Suet. Iul. 37-38, 
54). 
14  Concerning the role of legitimacy and the Roman triumph, see Lange 2016a: esp. 98-
105. See also Beard 2007:270-272. For the ‘formal rule’, such as it is, see Val. Max. 
2.8.7 and Gell. NA 5.6 As noted by several, e.g. Lange & Vervaet 2014, Havener 2016, 
Lange 2016b, many Romans of the late Republic did celebrate their victories over 
fellow Romans. The point here is that public opinion had to be manipulated to do so.  
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Rome’s allies might engage in treacherous behaviour themselves.15 Rome’s 
typical surety against allied treachery was to take hostages from royal and noble 
families. As a single example, it may be unclear whether Artoeces, king of Iberia 
had intended treachery (Dio 37.1-2), but Pompey insisted on hostages before re-
agreeing to peace. Roman generals might also win over their enemies’ allies 
through bribery.16 In Dio’s description of Massilia (mentioned above), the 
Massiliots were the only people in Gaul that did not cooperate, which mildly 
suggests that the typical Roman ally may have been flexible in these matters. 
To an extent, the Roman view on allies was pragmatic distrust — to use 
them while they stayed loyal. Cicero illuminates one ramification of this Roman 
realpolitik: the acceptance of continued Cilician banditry by Roman allies as long 
as they provided good service to Rome.17 The earlier Roman Republic saw similar 
situations with plundering by Numidian auxiliaries, as would the Principate with 
Gallic and German auxiliaries. Good service to Rome allowed — even required — 
Roman leaders to ignore bandit-like methods by their allies and even the auxilia.  
In turn, such methods were emphasised by Roman authors as a means of proving 
the barbarity of these allies. What proved the legitimacy of the allies was not their 
methods but their loyalty to the state. Interestingly, Dio explicitly makes early and 
open side-switching more honourable than delayed.18 This reveals Dio’s marked 
interest in pragmatic decision-making. 
For similar reasons, a frequent demand in peace negotiations was the 
extradition of deserters to Rome and to Rome’s allies. Deserters were well-noted in 
foreign wars and civil wars alike.19 No doubt, Rome’s harsh policy towards 
deserters served as something of a deterrent, even when the deserted-to was a 
Roman ally. Accordingly, we see key elements of the importance of managing 
                                                   
15  Dio F15 (coming from Zonaras) gives one such example of a bemusing episode of 
layered treachery. For a later example, see the account of Abgarus, a king who 
surreptitiously switched sides to Parthia during the expedition of Crassus (Dio 40.20). 
16  See Cato in Spain doing so at Dio F60.17 (Zonaras) cf. Dio F100, where Cato’s 
auxiliaries try to kill him. (καὶ ἐτεθνήκει γ᾽ ἂν εἰ λίθων εὐπορήκεσαν˙ ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χωρίον 
ἐν ᾧ συνειλέχατο ἐγεωργεῖτο καὶ δίυγρον κατὰ τύχην ἦν, οὐδὲν ὑπὸ βώλων ἔπαθεν.) 
17  Here we might examine the role of Cicero’s letters on Antipater of Derbe (Cic. Fam. 
13.73-74) alongside Strabo’s description (12.1.4). Cicero is also inconsistent on Cilician 
auxiliaries, who are either his best or worst soldiers depending on his audience. 
18  We find this in the case of the comparison of Abgarus and Alchaudonius (40.20-23). 
Later in his text, we see Dio’s surprise at a barbarian ally keeping its promises (The 
Astingia and Lacringi at 72.11-12). 
19  Dio tends to prefer forms of διαδίδωμι for ‘to desert’, though forms of αὐτομόλος are 
common as well for ‘deserters’. A few instances in Dio: 19.F20 (Zonaras) has διαδίδωμι 
(from Antiochus), F102 contains forms of both, F111 uses αὐτομόλος. 
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desertion in the following three examples of desertion, all within a roughly forty-
year period: 
ὅτι τῷ Ἰουγούρθᾳ ὁ Μέτελλος προσπέμψαντί οἱ ὑπὲρ τῆς εἰρήνης πολλὰ 
καθ᾽ ἓν ἕκαστον ὡς καὶ μόνον ἐπέταξε, καὶ οὕτως ὁμήρους τε παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ 
καὶ ὅπλα τούς τε ἐλέφαντας καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους τούς τε αὐτομόλους 
ἔλαβε. καὶ τούτους μὲν πάντας ἀπέκτεινεν … ὅτι τῷ Μετέλλῳ ἤχθετο ὁ 
Γαύδας, ὅτι μήτε τοὺς αὐτομόλους μήτε φρουρὰν στρατιωτῶν Ῥωμαίων 
αἰτήσας παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἔλαβεν 
And when Metellus sent to Jugurtha concerning the price of peace, he 
demanded many things as if each demand were the last one, and this way 
from him he took in turn hostages, armour, elephants, prisoners and 
deserters. And Metellus killed all of these (i.e. the deserters) … and [the 
Numidian prince] Gaudas was angry with Metellus because despite his 
requests, Gaudas received neither the deserters nor a bodyguard of Roman 
soldiers from Metellus … (Dio 26.F89.1, 89.4, trans. mine). 
While in the Numidian example it is not entirely clear who the automoloi are, 
context suggests that they were ex-Roman soldiers in the employ of Jugurtha, 
whom Gaudas sought to re-employ as well, as a surety against assassination. The 
phenomenon of Roman soldiers seeking employment outside of Rome in search of 
a larger paycheck is not particularly unusual, though we cannot always assume a 
purely mercenary motive. It was reasonably common for Rome to provide 
bodyguards to allied kings, though to what degree these were honorary or 
functional may remain unclear. 
ὁ δὲ τούτοις οὐκ ἐσπείσατο˙ τήν τε γὰρ πολιτείαν ἠξίουν οὐχ ἑαυτοῖς μόνον 
ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ηὐτομοληκόσι πρὸς σφᾶς δοθῆναι, καὶ οὔτε τι τῆς λείας ἣν 
εἶχον ἀποδοῦναι ἤθελον, καὶ τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους τούς τε αὐτομόλους σφῶν 
πάντας ἀπῄτουν, ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς βουλευτὰς τὴν εἰρήνην ἔτι τὴν πρὸς 
αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ τούτοις ἑλέσθαι. 
And he [Metellus] did not make peace with them, for they [the Samnites] 
demanded citizenship to be granted both for themselves and also for those 
who had deserted to them, they would not return the booty they had taken, 
and they demanded the return of their captives and those who had deserted 
from them. After this, the senators no longer desired to obtain peace with 
them on these terms (Dio F102.7, trans. mine). 
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This second example, coming at the tail end of a civil war, accentuates the 
importance of deserters.20 The Samnites insisted on victory-terms vis-à-vis the 
Romans. Now the quarrel about Roman deserters to the Samnites (who already had 
Roman citizenship) and the Samnite deserters to the Romans (who would 
presumably gain citizenship in either case) may have less to do with citizenship 
than legitimacy. Of course, politeia here may indicate not only citizenship but also 
the free exercise of citizenship. The crux of the matter is not whether these men 
will vote, but whether these men will be punished (and unjustified desertion was 
generally punished by death, which rather makes their voting privileges 
irrelevant).21 
κελεύσαντος δὲ αὐτῷ τοῦ Πομπηίου τά τε ὅπλα καταθέσθαι καὶ τοὺς 
αὐτομόλους ἐκδοῦναι οὐκ ἔσχε καιρὸν βουλεύσασθαι: ἀκούσαντες γὰρ 
ταῦτα οἱ ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ αὐτοῦ ὄντες, καὶ φοβηθέντες οἵ τε αὐτόμολοι 
(πολλοὶ δὲ ἦσαν) μὴ ἐκδοθῶσι, καὶ οἱ βάρβαροι μὴ ἄνευ ἐκείνων πολεμεῖν 
ἀναγκασθῶσιν, ἐθορύβησαν. 
And when Pompey ordered him [Mithridates] to set down his arms and 
hand over his deserters, Mithridates had no opportunity to consider, for 
those in his army heard, and the deserters (and there were many), afraid 
they would be turned over, and the barbarians, afraid they would be forced 
to fight without them, all made a ruckus (Dio 36.45.4, trans. mine). 
The third example is rightly framed as foreign war, but it need not be entirely so. 
That is, many of the deserters in the army of Mithridates were not recent defectors, 
but supporters of Marius and Sertorius or proscribed anti-Sullans and their 
descendants. It is telling that Pompey’s offer seemed so limited — that the 
extradition of the deserters to Mithridates is not merely a pro forma concession but 
quite a major one.22 It is not hard to see a pattern in Roman demands for the return 
of deserters. The return of deserters is a clear sign of victory and Rome is rarely 
willing to agree to a peace without this provision.23 This was, for example, after the 
                                                   
20  On civil war in Dio, see Lange 2016b, 2019, inter alia, Madsen 2019. 
21  Appian (Civil wars 1.49, 1.53) only indicates that the Romans gave citizenship to the 
allies who did not revolt in the war first and the Samnites and Lucanians last. 
See also Southern 1996:148-149 on desertion. Southern mentions later examples of 
desertion in Dio (e.g. 68.9.5; 73.2.2) but not these early ones.  
22  It also remains plausible that like the negotiations at Carthage in the Punic Wars (See 
Dio F57-59 or Zonaras 14 cf. Livy 30 passim) and the negotiations between Metellus 
and Jugurtha mentioned above, this was not Pompey’s final list of demands. 
23  A study of Livy and Polybius will reveal that the extradition of deserters is a standard 
demand of peace terms such as in the second Macedonian war (Polyb. 18.44) or the War 
with Antiochus (Livy 32.33, Polyb. 18.1-2). 
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defeat of Antonius ‘Creticus’ in 71, the sticking point for a new treaty with the 
Cretans, who were only willing to return their captives.24 
Roman leaders might also be less than trustworthy towards their allies.  
In fighting Perseus, Licinius Crassus sacked several of the cities he was ostensibly 
there to liberate.25 Caesar too is depicted as engaging in semi-treacherous attacks 
on allies.26 These were not unusual in Roman history, they were part of the system 
of empire. Complicating the matter further is the aforementioned observation that 
civil war victors in the republic sought triumphs over the allies of the defeated 
parties, who were arguably simply fulfilling their treaty obligations to Rome, such 
as was the case for Juba of Africa. Yet some allies unquestionably came down on 
the wrong side and managed to stay in the good graces of Rome, though perhaps 
not without intervention. While Caesar initially pardoned the eastern allies of 
Pompey (Dio 41.62-63), Cicero later had to give a speech (pro rege Deiotaro) on 
behalf of Deiotarus of Galatia, and the unfortunate Tarcondimotus of Cilicia 
managed to side with Pompey, the ‘Liberators’, and Antony each in turn, without 
resulting penalties from Rome. Some allied kings were portrayed as having tried to 
become independent from Rome or to gain territory.27 
Dio’s views on this Late Republican self-aggrandizement and these 
questionable justifications rest in how he thinks about legitimate authority.  
Banditry was defined principally by the legitimacy of their commander’s claim to 
authority. In this sense, when writers speak against banditry, the rhetorical 
objection is not to the pillage — common to bandit gangs and state-run armies 
alike — but instead to the lack of state authority for (and the state’s ability to 
negotiate with) the bandit leader.28 In addition, that state authority was crucial to 
whether the commanders are legitimately employing violence to their ends. 
Thus, the leisteia in Dio’s work are worth examining as literary loci that 
may reflect Dio’s attitudes towards civil war.29 To Dio, uncontrolled soldiers are 
                                                   
24  Dio F111.1.  
25  Dio F65. 
26  See Dio 37.53, which rather recounts Caesar as too eager to seek out conflicts to win. 
Similarly, see the account of Claudius and the Salassi (22.74). 
27  Judging from Cicero’s counterarguments in pro rege Deiotaro, this seems to have been 
one of the charges. Juba agreed to join Pompey’s partisans in exchange for Roman 
North Africa (Dio 43.4). Pharnaces, one of the only eastern allies not to join Pompey, 
had offered to join in exchange for Syrian territory (41.55.3), and Caesar later 
remonstrated with him (41.63.4).  
28  This is one of the primary arguments of Beek 2015 and Beek 2019. 
29  As noted in de Souza 1999:9-11, Dio prefers katapontistes as a term for the sea-based 
pirate, though forms of leistes certainly occur. For Dio on Cilician piracy, Gabrielsen 
2007:398-401 may be worth examining. 
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essentially bandits.30 Moreover, indeed we see in book 36 (17-37) an in-depth study 
of the piracy crisis of the 60s BCE, and the resulting grant of an extraordinary 
command to Pompey. It is not the clearest representation of Dio’s attitudes towards 
monarchy, democracy, and political dynasteia, which might even reflect some 
degree of ambivalence or uncertainty on Dio’s part, but Dio does appear to 
consider some of Pompey’s opponents as modelling later practice.31 In particular, 
Dio simultaneously praises Pompey’s (eventual) relinquishment of his powers and 
army and advises that despite being in accordance with the mos maiorum, it was 
instrumental in his later defeat by Caesar.32 The act is at the same time, both ethical 
and foolish. Dio also notes Caesar as able but unwilling to hunt bandits (37.52), as 
this would interfere with his greater political goals, thus reversing the analysis of 
power-seeking. 
Dio’s political philosophy 
Like most ancient historians, Dio provides programmatic statements (though the 
fragmentary nature of the contents poses some uncertainty to the ordering) at the 
beginning of his first book, where he asserts his purpose. Dio’s bald assertion to 
have read everything he could stands out. His declaration to provide a Rome-
centred narrative of peace and of war is noteworthy, if not exceptional; other 
historians often focused on wars (explicitly so in the narratives of Appian or 
Florus), and Dio’s own excerpters provide a greater quantity of fragments 
concerning war than peace. 
While Millar asserted Dio to have little to no theory of history, the same 
cannot be said of his position on politics and philosophy, or weighing in on the 
always popular monarchy-aristocracy-democracy debate.33 Here, his position might 
be best summed up as advocating for a variant of monarchy we might call 
‘restrained autocracy’.34 That restraint was necessary both for the establishment of 
political legitimacy and because of human nature (in Dio’s view, influenced by 
Thucydides) always leading to a desire to seek mastery over others. Throughout 
the fragments of the first thirty-five books, Dio issues numerous gnomic statements 
                                                   
30  See de Blois 1998-1999:276, with further references. Dio 12.27, 75.2.5 bears him out 
here. Cf. Miller 1964:109. 
31  Kemezis 2014:113 calls it ‘our first fully-surviving example [in Dio] of how public 
decision-making and discourse works under dynasteia, and it is not an edifying sight’. 
32  Dio 37.20, for Pompey’s relinquishment of power. 
33  Millar 1964:118. This assertion has been much chewed over in the fifty years since. 
34  Such a view was also hinted at by Plutarch, eg. Comp. Vit Thes. et Rom. 2. 
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on the legitimacy of violence.35 For example, we see Dio justifying the desires of 
many to seek mastery over others in the three following excerpts: 
(1.F5.4) καὶ αὐτοί τε ἐξέμαθον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξεδίδαξαν ὅτι οὔθ᾽ οἱ 
τιμωρούμενοί τινας κατορθοῦσι πάντως, ὅτι προηδίκηνται, οὔθ᾽ οἱ παρὰ 
τῶν κρειττόνων ἀπαιτοῦντές τινα ἀπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτά, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις καὶ 
τὰ λοιπὰ προσαπολλύουσιν. 
They themselves learned well and taught others the lesson that those who 
seek to avenge their wrongs are not invariably successful merely because 
they have first suffered injury, and that those who make demands on 
stronger men do not necessarily get what they demand, but often lose even 
what they had before (trans. Cary). 
(1.F5.12) οὕτω που φύσει πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπινον οὐ φέρει πρός τε τοῦ ὁμοίου 
καὶ τοῦ συνήθους, τὰ μὲν φθόνῳ τὰ δὲ καταφρονήσει αὐτοῦ, ἀρχόμενον. 
So, no doubt, it is ordered by Nature that whatever is human shall not 
submit to be ruled by that which is like it and familiar to it, partly through 
jealousy, partly through contempt of it’ (trans. Cary, cf. F6.3). 
(F7.3) …ἐκ τῆς ἐμφύτου τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρός τε τὸ ὅμοιον φιλονεικίας καὶ 
πρὸς τὸ ἄρχειν ἑτέρων ἐπιθυμίας … 
… the inherent disposition of men to quarrel with their equals and to desire 
to rule others (trans. Cary). 
 
But more than musing about predispositions to rule, Dio suggests that moderation 
in rule and control is the ideal … 
(F13.14) ὅτι ὅταν πολλοὶ καθ᾽ ἓν γενόμενοι πλεονεκτήσωσι βιασάμενοι, 
παραχρῆμα μὲν ὁμολογίᾳ τινὶ ἐπιεικεῖ θρασύνονται, διαλυθέντες δὲ ἄλλος 
κατ᾽ ἄλλην πρόφασιν δικαιοῦνται. 
Whenever a large number of men band together and seek their own 
advantage by violence, they have for the time being some equitable 
agreement and display boldness, but later they become divided and are 
punished on various pretexts (trans. Cary). 
(F43.13-14) συμβαίνει γὰρ ὡς πλήθει τοῖς μὲν ἐκ λογισμοῦ τι δεδιόσιν 
ὀρθοῦσθαι διὰ προφυλακὴν αὐτοῦ, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀπρονοήτως θρασυνομένοις 
                                                   
35  Moreover, the pithy nature of these statements, sometimes appearing in isolated 
fragments, led to their survival. 
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φθείρεσθαι δι᾽ ἀφυλαξίαν.” τὸ μὲν σωφρονοῦν καὶ κτᾶται τὰς νίκας καὶ 
γενομένας φυλάσσει, τὸ δ᾽ ἀσελγαῖνον οὔτε περιγίγνεταί τινος, κἂν ἄρα 
εὐτυχήσῃ ποτὲ ἔν τινι, ῥᾷστα αὐτὸ ἀπόλλυσι: κἂν μὲν διασώσῃ τι, χεῖρον 
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ παρὰ λόγον εὐπραγῆσαι γενόμενον, οὐχ ὅσον οὐκ ἐκείνου τι 
ὀνίναται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὸ προσδιαφθείρεται. 
For it usually happens that those who are in dread of something as a result 
of calculation are successful because of their precaution against it, whereas 
those who are bold through lack of foresight are ruined because of their 
unguarded state. Moderation both obtains victories and preserves them after 
they are won, whereas license can prevail against nothing, and if it ever 
should be fortunate in any matter, very easily destroys it (trans. Cary). 
 
But while such moderation might be the ideal, reality tends to follow power.  
Pragmatically, the goal is not to subvert the natural tendency for rule, but to 
influence it so that the best leaders come into power. 
(F110.4) οὐδὲν γὰρ καὶ στράτευμα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὅσα ἀρχῆς τινος δεῖται 
οὕτως οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον οὔτε ἐπὶ τὸ κρεῖττον προάγει ὡς ὅ τε τρόπος καὶ ἡ 
δίαιτα τοῦ ἐπιστατοῦντος αὐτῶν˙ πρὸς γὰρ τὰς γνώμας τάς τε πράξεις τῶν 
ἡγουμένων σφίσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἐξομοιοῦνται, καὶ ὁποῖα ἂν ἐκείνους δρῶντας 
ἴδωσι, τοιαῦτα καὶ αὐτοί, οἱ μὲν ὡς ἀληθῶς, οἱ δὲ καὶ προσποιούμενοι, 
πράττουσιν. 
For nothing leads on an army, or anything else requiring some control, to 
better or worse like the character and habits of the person presiding over it. 
The majority naturally imitate the opinions and deeds of their leaders, and 
do whatever they see them doing, some from real inclination and others as a 
mere pretence (trans. Cary). 
Many other gnomic statements of the sort exist.36 A pattern emerges of Dio’s 
philosophy. Humans naturally seek to gain power and to dominate others, 
pragmatic behaviour is superior to moral behaviour, and power restrains the weak 
from acting authentically (i.e. those who do not have power lack it because they 
have failed to get it, not because they do not want it). Despite the negativity 
imbedded in Dio’s description of human nature, the practicable solution is not to 
stop such violence but rather to control it, so that it is moderated and not excessive 
(as seen in F13.14 and F43.14 above). Dio has a problem with his fellow 
historians, namely that the mos maiorum, the very customs that theoretically 
imposed restraint upon the Romans, were instead alternately causing chaos by 
                                                   
36  See, for example, F12, F24, 8F36f. 
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preventing competent leadership in the first place and by failing to impose brakes 
upon leaders in charge (or doing so on false pretences).  Examples of this in Dio 
can be found at F24 (on the exile of Camillus) and F65 (on Licinius Crassus).37 
Dio regards such civil conflict as natural — though not truly desirable — 
and predictable.38 Arguably, the solution to such civil conflict lay in external 
conflict, keeping contenders too busy to fight each other. But a brief study here of 
Dio’s presentations of Marius and Sulla, of Pompey and Caesar, and of Antony, 
Octavian, and Sextus Pompey should put that aside, if for no other reason than the 
prominence of Dio’s comparison of the civil war of 193-197 CE with that of 
Marius and Sulla (Dio 76.7-8).39 That Dio regarded the Mediterranean world of 
three centuries prior to be comparable is clearly seen also by his assessment of 
Dalmatia and Pannonia at 49.36 — Dio’s own experience is taken as evidence for 
Octavian’s experience.40 
Cliff Ando correctly argued that Dio does not truly take the emperors to 
task for their methods of acquiring power as much as what they do with it once 
they have.41 Instead, Dio regards the pragmatic steps they take in establishing their 
legitimacy to be crucial and pays keen attention to them. Contemporary imperial 
rule has led Dio to focus upon the pragmatics of imperial succession, and to record 
methods of accession to power.42 Dio does not, however, view this vein of 
succession as against the mos maiorum, but in keeping with the general philosophy 
seen in the earlier books. Even in discussing the famous mercy of Caesar, Dio 
makes a point to observe that he did not grant favours for nothing.43 This ‘model of 
imperial legitimacy as based on conventional conduct’ is what Dio describes not as 
something ideal but as something real.44 For Dio, imperial succession is not a 
violation of the mos maiorum, but a normal extension of it. So, while Dio’s 
                                                   
37  See also Madsen (2019:472-475) for Dio’s view that the earlier days of the Republic did 
not lack the corruption of the Late Republic. 
38  See Madsen 2019:471: ‘Although Dio was a firm critic of the ravages of civil war, it is 
nevertheless important to note that he believed in its transformative effects’. 
39  For comparison, see the description of Sulla at Dio 30-35.109. 
40  For discussion of this passage of Dio in particular, see Barnes 1984:247-248. 
41  Ando 2016:516. 
42  As observed by Kelly 2007, e.g. 163-164 the emperor’s legitimacy could be harmed by 
excessive violence just as Pompey’s suffered in 52 BCE (see Dio 40.53, 54.7, 60.17 for 
variously-handled riots). 
43  Dio 43.39.5. Dio’s Caesar is frequently pragmatic, and Dio excuses certain decisions on 
the grounds of necessity, such as Caesar’s reluctant truce with the Britons (39.51). 
44  Quote from Ando 2016:516. Where Ando makes his arguments in comparing the 
Severans to the ideas laid out in book 53, mine are rooted in comparisons with the 
powerful figures preceding Augustus in the Late Republic. I remain grateful to Andrew 
Scott in pointing this article out to me.  
LEGITIMATE VIOLENCE IN ILLEGITIMATE TIMES  77 
 
historian counterparts might suggest that a return to the mos maiorum would solve 
the problems of the Roman Empire, Dio implies that this sort of backward-looking 
revision would simply recreate the problems. 
Much like the famous theory of the ‘tragedy of the commons’, where what 
benefits the individual does not benefit society, it only makes sense to Dio that 
those who can choose to seize and consolidate power should seize and consolidate 
power, even though to Dio this is ultimately problematic for the senatorial class 
and for the state as a whole. We see this musing at 5.18, where he suggests the best 
leaders in war are not the best in peace, and vice versa. It may be worth thinking 
about this as Dio’s ‘Tragedy of Power’ — in order to effectively gain the rule of 
the state (and, incidentally, to stay alive as well) it is necessary to take actions that 
reduce the effectiveness of ruling the state once one actually possesses it. 
The noble bandit and the ‘tragedy of power’ 
This model of ‘tragedy of power’ served as more than idle navel-gazing, as we can 
see in Dio’s representation of ‘noble bandits’, men who serve to poke holes in the 
idea that the best men are in charge. Because of the model Dio has shown for 
imperial accession, the empire selects for the men who are the best at getting 
power, not necessarily at using it effectively.  So in most cases, the men who are 
the emperors are not the men who would be best at being emperor.45  By showing 
Roman leaders to be upstaged by far less powerful rivals, rebels, and minor kings, 
Dio points out some accompanying flaws in what has become the de facto method 
of attaining power in Rome. 
It should be noted here that the nobility retained a certain role in 
establishing legitimacy, though it had not nearly so much power as even it had had 
in the late republic. Dio’s reading of much second-century literature can likely be 
taken for granted. We might expect Dio, a la Polybius, to be trying to offer advice 
to future statesmen, or to explain the intricacies of the Roman state to newly-
enfranchised Greeks. Neither seems particularly likely, but Dio does seem to 
perceive Roman problems with Greek eyes.46 This is more likely to be due to his 
readings of authors like Polybius and Diodorus Siculus than representative of early 
third-century politics. 
For our purposes, the ‘noble bandit’ may be seen as the figure who acts in 
defiance of the law but consistent with his own moral code. Following from this 
                                                   
45  It remains likely that Dio approved more of the ‘Adoptive’ Emperors for apparently 
sidestepping the seizure of power, but this system is not in play for the Late Republic or 
the third century CE.   
46  See de Blois 1984:361-363 for the impact of the new citizen Greeks in the early third 
century. 
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argument, the bandit is primarily defined as an illegitimate figure. This does not 
necessarily clash with his inner nobility at all. The illicit acts are not necessarily 
immoral. Indeed, the figures are typically represented to have moral potential, 
although this development is not realized in the end.  But in one form or another, 
these figures have potential and fail to have legitimate authority. 
Dio employs the topos of the noble bandit with the relatively obscure 
Lusitanian leader Viriathus, who rallies Spain against Roman aggression. Key to 
the development of the noble bandit figure is the intertwining of physical and 
mental ability along with the tendency to engage in irregular actions: 
Viriathus: (Dio, F73) καὶ διὰ ταῦτα παντὸς μὲν καύματος, παντὸς δὲ ψύχους 
κρείσσων ἦν, καὶ οὔθ᾽ ὑπὸ λιμοῦ ποτε ἐπόνησεν οὔθ᾽ ὑπὸ ἄλλης τινὸς 
ἀκηδίας ἐταλαιπώρησεν. 
Because of this life, he [Viriathus] was superior to any heat or cold and he 
never suffered from hunger nor afflicted by any other lack. 
 
Accordingly, Dio’s Viriathus looks much like similar leaders in Sallust and 
Plutarch.47 Viriathus may be a tough and hardy foe, but so are Jugurtha, Catiline, 
and Sertorius: 
Jugurtha: (Sall. Iug. 6) pollens viribus, decora facie, sed multo maxume 
ingenio validus, non se luxu neque inertiae corrumpendum dedit 
… strong, handsome, but most of all, intelligent, did not give himself to be 
corrupted by luxury and laziness … 
Sertorius: (Plut. Ser. 13.1) κατεσκευασμένον ἔχοντι θαυμασίως τὸ σῶμα 
ῥώμῃ καί τάχει καί λιτότητι. 
… having a body amazingly equipped with strength, speed, and hardiness. 
Catiline: (Sall. Cat. 5.1,3) fuit magna vi et animi et corporis…corpus 
patiens inediae, algoris, vigiliae supra quam quoiquam credibile est. 
[Catiline] had great power both of mind and of body … He had a body 
capable of enduring hunger, cold, sleeplessness, more than can be believed 
by anyone. 
                                                   
47  For the importance of being able to deal with hardship, see Plutarch’s comparison of 
Timoleon and Aemilius, (Comp. Vit. Tim. et Aem. 2.10) where this ability to endure is 
spelled out as a virtue (and not merely the ability of barbarians). 
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These ‘noble bandits’ also prove themselves to be competent, if often unorthodox, 
military leaders.48 The contemporary Roman counterparts to a figure like Viriathus 
do not come off well in Dio. For instance, the cruel Caepio was almost murdered 
by his own men.49 Whether by Dio’s own interests or those of his excerptors, we 
are presented with a collection of incompetent and/or wicked Roman leaders, often 
presented with a virtuous foil. 
Dio relies upon his models to construct portraits of the figures in his history. 
Felix Bulla, while a savage bandit, is also portrayed with redeeming features and a 
wilful defiance of a hypocritical Roman order. In this way, Bulla appears as a form 
of the ‘noble bandit’.50 
At this period, one Bulla, an Italian, got together a robber band of about six 
hundred men, and for two years continued to plunder Italy under the very 
noses of the emperors and of a multitude of soldiers. […] Later, he assumed 
the dress of a magistrate, ascended the tribunal, and having summoned the 
centurion, caused part of his head to be shaved, and then said: ‘Carry this 
message to your masters: “Feed your slaves, so that they may not turn to 
brigandage”’. Bulla had with him, in fact, a very large number of imperial 
freedmen, some of whom had been poorly paid, while others had received 
absolutely no pay at all. Severus, informed of these various occurrences, 
was angry at the thought that though he was winning the wars in Britain 
through others, yet he himself had proved no match for a robber in Italy; 
and finally he sent a tribune from his body-guard with many horsemen, after 
threatening him with dire punishment if he should fail to bring back the 
robber alive. So this tribune, having learned that the brigand was intimate 
with another man's wife, persuaded her through her husband to assist them 
on promise of immunity. As a result, the robber was arrested while asleep in 
a cave. Papinian, the prefect, asked him, ‘Why did you become a robber?’ 
And he replied: ‘Why are you a prefect?’ Later, after due proclamation, he 
                                                   
48  For a fuller study of the character portraits discussed briefly here (including also 
Spartacus and some mention of Pompey, but without Felix Bulla), see Beek 2015:258-
263. Grünewald 2004 remains the standard treatment of Hobsbawm’s theory of the 
noble bandit applied to the Roman world.This sort of portrait also appears for competent 
Roman enemies like Mithridates and Hannibal, and even allies such as Massinissa of 
Numidia. 
49  Dio F78. 
50  See above. See also Shaw 1984:44-46, Van Dam 1977:121f. See Grünewald 2004:124, 
133-135, for a push against the noble bandit characterization in favour of ‘imperial 
challenger’. 
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was given to wild beasts, and his band was broken up  —  to such an extent 
did the strength of the whole six hundred lie in him (trans. Cary).51 
It is striking to see that Severus is explicitly stated here to be embarrassed by 
Bulla’s success.52 The lack of references to Bulla in other sources (notably Dio’s 
contemporary Herodian, though he also appears absent from the HA) has led some 
to infer that Bulla was a realistic, but ultimately fictitious character. By this 
argument, Bulla served as a personification of the all-too-common bandit problem 
in the Roman Empire, but a problem that is overtly and intentionally acting in 
opposition to the empire rather than an apparent symptom of the empire’s flaws.53 
This use of Bulla (and that of the peculiar episode of Claudius at 75.2.4) 
show evidence that Severus was a military leader thinking in terms of military 
solutions, but also offers a suggestion that some problems might have domestic 
solutions — those which Severus was ill-equipped to render. Looking back to the 
books on the Republic, Dio’s praise of Pompey’s solution of settling the pirates 
and mild scorn for Caesar dealing only with those bandits that had a political 
benefit to him suggest that Bulla’s line about feeding the slaves to prevent 
brigandage was entirely within Dio’s own views on the matter.54 
Dio’s portrayal at first imagines contemporary Roman leaders relying upon 
the mos maiorum (suitably interpreted) as a guide to action. This was, after all, still 
standard practice in Rome. Dio rejects this practice, however, perceiving it as 
wilfully repeating historical mistakes. Dio tacitly advocates change by not showing 
                                                   
51  Dio 77[76].10: [1] ἐν δὲ τῷ καιρῷ τούτῳ Βούλλας τις Ἰταλὸς ἀνήρ, λῃστήριον 
συστησάμενος ὡς ἑξακοσίων ἀνδρῶν, ἐλῄζετο τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἐπὶ ἔτη δύο, παρόντων μὲν 
τῶν αὐτοκρατόρων, παρόντων δὲ καὶ στρατιωτῶν τοσούτων. … 
 [5] καὶ μετὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα ἀνέβη σχῆμα ἄρχοντος ἀναλαβών, καὶ καλέσας τὸν 
ἑκατόνταρχον τῆς τε κεφαλῆς ἀπεξύρησε, καὶ ἔφη ‘ἄγγελλε τοῖς δεσπόταις σου ὅτι τοὺς 
δούλους ὑμῶν τρέφετε, ἵνα μὴ λῃστεύωσι.’ πλείστους γὰρ ὅσους τῶν Καισαρείων εἶχε, 
τοὺς μὲν ὀλιγομίσθους [6] τοὺς δὲ καὶ παντελῶς ἀμίσθους γεγονότας. ταῦτ᾽ οὖν ὁ 
Σεουῆρος ὡς ἕκαστα πυνθανόμενος, ὀργῇ ἔφερεν ὅτι ἐν τῇ Βρεττανίᾳ τοὺς πολέμους δι᾽ 
ἑτέρων νικῶν αὐτὸς ἐν τῇ Ἰταλίᾳ λῃστοῦ ἥττων ἐγένετο˙ καὶ τέλος χιλίαρχον ἐκ τῶν 
σωματοφυλάκων σὺν ἱππεῦσι πολλοῖς ἔστειλε, δεινὰ ἄττα αὐτῷ ἀπειλήσας, ἂν μὴ ζῶντα 
αὐτὸν ἀγάγῃ. καὶ οὕτως ἐκεῖνος μαθὼν ὅτι γυναικί τινι ἀλλοτρίᾳ χρῷτο, ἀνέπεισεν 
αὐτὴν διὰ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐπ᾽ ἀδείᾳ [7] συνάρασθαι σφίσι. κἀκ τούτου ἐν σπηλαίῳ τινὶ 
καθεύδων συνελήφθη. καὶ αὐτὸν ὁ Παπινιανὸς ὁ ἔπαρχος ἀνήρετο ‘διὰ τί ἐλῄστευσας;’ 
καὶ αὐτὸς ἀπεκρίνατο ‘διὰ τί σὺ ἔπαρχος εἶ;’ καὶ θηρίοις μετὰ τοῦτο ὑπὸ κηρύγματος 
ἐδόθη, καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ λῃστρικὸν διελύθη: οὕτω που ἐν ἐκείνῳ πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἑξακοσίων 
ἰσχὺς ἦν. 
52  According to Birley 1972:242-243, 249, Bulla’s success weighed heavily upon Severus. 
53  See also Gleason 2011:57-59 on this point. 
54  See Coudry 2016 on Pompey here.  
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the same adherence to past practice as seen in other Roman historians, nor does he 
ameliorate the flaws of past Roman heroes. 
I also interpret the depiction of mutinies in such a vein. Mutiny is never to 
be tolerated.55 In this, Dio finds himself in good literary company, including both 
historians like Polybius and anecdotal writers like Valerius Maximus, Plutarch and 
Polyaenus. What does not escape Dio, however, is that the great leaders of the past, 
including both Aurelius and Augustus, as well as Julius Caesar, knew that 
pragmatic negotiation with their soldiers was necessary.56 While other authors, (like 
Polyaenus, writing under the rule of Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus), would 
claim that Julius Caesar would never let a mutineer go unpunished, Dio shows him 
as willing to negotiate.57 
At this point, we should reconsider some of the most-famous lines of 
descriptions of the Severans, particularly the deathbed advice of Severus.58 Much 
ink has already been spilled on interpreting his famous advice to love each other, 
pay the soldiers, and scorn everyone else. Similarly, Caracalla’s call to adjudicate 
soldiers’ minor issues belies the evidence that such a call relies upon the soldiers’ 
willingness to accept his decisions.59 Caesar’s willingness to execute soldiers who 
disagree with him, marked by Dio, reflects an important precedent for the empire.60 
Secondly, when we consider Dio’s account of the middle republic (for 
which we rely heavily on the epitome of Zonaras), we see such a plethora of bad 
behaviour that we might consider the possibility that Zonaras selected for such 
examples as most interesting. But more so than in a Livy or a Polyaenus, we see 
                                                   
55  For my purposes here, the words I am examining are: in Latin, forms of the word 
seditio, and in Greek, participles of the verb στασιάζω. 
56  See Beek 2020 (forthcoming) for some aspects of this argument at greater length. 
57  The sources on Caesar dealing with unrest generally agree that Caesar was very 
generous up to a point and quite strict thereafter. The main difference is in where that 
limiting point actually lies. Dio 42.52-55 (presumably the same episode Polyaenus 
discusses) shows how Caesar discharged some seditious elements with land grants, kept 
others close, and stationed others in the thick of the fighting. Dio 41.35.5 has Caesar rig 
the drawing of lots to execute the outspoken. In 43.14, Caesar merely discharges the 
men. Suet. Iul. 69-70 may be of interest for comparison. Cf. Kemezis 2016 on Caesar’s 
dealing with the Vesontio mutiny. Caesar’s own work is not to be trusted on moments 
he found embarrassing, and he routinely omits such events from his accounts. See Van 
Stekelenburg 1976:46-47 on this tendency. Here, Dio’s apparent sympathy to pragmatic 
solutions with unruly soldiers resembles Polybius (i.e. his description of the older and 
younger Scipios) more than most sources on the Republic. See Beek 2020 (forthcoming) 
on Caesar’s portrayal in Polyaenus and Frontinus.  
58  Dio 77[76].15.2. Herodian’s discussion (2.4) on Pertinax might also be of interest. 
59  79[78].1.3 contains a peculiar example, discussed by Scott 2018:30-31. 
60  Some of these are noted above in note 57, i.e. 41.35.5 and 42.55. Harrington 1977:162, 
also remarks on this tendency. See also Hurlet 2016 for Pompey. 
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Romans behaving badly. Moreover, this is of import because it is the middle 
republic, particularly the end of the third century BCE, that is often taken as the 
best example of the Roman state.61 A description of the bad behaviour of these 
Roman leaders is often followed by an explanation for how they justified and 
legitimised it, a literary practice easily recognized in both the early books on the 
republic and in the late books on the contemporary empire. 
Thirdly, the employment of foreigners in the army is a particularly fraught 
issue for historians. Dio notes times of success and times of peril and has a 
particular dislike of foreigners in the Praetorian Guard.62 This situation creates a 
very different dynamic in Dio’s work: unlike for most of his history, in this case, 
Dio is a highly-biased eyewitness. Dio considers the emperors to keep shifting the 
source of their legitimacy to maintain control. As much as Dio dislikes the 
emperors seeking to establish legitimacy from military supporters rather than 
senatorial supporters, he is still more suspicious of the emperors claiming 
legitimacy from ‘foreign’ military supporters. Likewise, Dio remains suspicious of 
the influence of freedmen.63 The army is prone to banditry, and needs an emperor 
to keep it in line. 
Dio and the Severans 
Dio’s Roman history was probably written during the reign of Severus Alexander, 
and Dio has either gained the freedom to speak more freely about Severus or 
changed his views on him over the previous decade. Regardless, the Roman history 
is less positive than earlier writings on Septimius Severus.64 As Jussi Rantala 
argued, this shift may well be due to the abandonment of an initially mild reign in 
favour of a Sulla-style autocracy after the civil war with Albinus.65 Like Sulla (and 
                                                   
61  Polybius and Sallust both pin 216 BCE (the refusal of the Romans to surrender after 
Cannae) as the pinnacle of the Roman state and character. Imperial-era writers would of 
course hearken back to Augustus instead, and indeed Dio spends great effort in 
describing the late Republic, but also in describing the Augustan state in books 52-53 … 
but Dio nevertheless buys into the Polybian / Sallustian model of decline from 216 BCE 
(see Dio at F64 inveighing against ‘getting a taste of Asiatic softness’ (οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι τῆς 
τρυφῆς τῆς Ἀσιανῆς γευσάμενοι). 
62  See Dio 75[74].2, for remarks on the Praetorian Guard. See Southern & Dixon 1996:8 
for a suggestion that the dislike was a personal bias from his own political career. Dio’s 
recommendations at 52.19f. also suggest ideas along these lines, while 50.2-3 and 57.6 
suggest Dio’s general dislike of Gauls, whether in the army or elsewhere. 
63  See de Blois 1984:366, with further references. 
64  See Barnes 1984 on the composition of Dio’s History, cf. Wheeler 1993:18-19, inter 
alia.  See Kemezis 2014 for an analysis of the influence of the official Severan line on 
Dio’s history. 
65  See Rantala 2016:165-166. 
LEGITIMATE VIOLENCE IN ILLEGITIMATE TIMES  83 
 
Bulla), Severus acts because he can, and effectively gains authority through 
impunity. Similarly, Dio (44.1-6) expresses disapproval of Caesar’s seizing and 
using of power, but disapproves the overthrow by the ‘Liberators’ more, as it 
would lead to total disorder. We naturally assume disapproval of tyranny, though 
that may be presumptuous.66 While Dio might express the superiority of the senate 
in a number of places, he is not one to advocate a senatorial overthrow of the 
emperor. 
Regarding Dio’s ideas of legitimacy, Caracalla leaps out as a monarch to 
study, despite the lack of civil war. Dio describes Caracalla as fickle and arbitrary, 
but perhaps not quite as wholly negatively as generally believed (as Davenport also 
argues).67 Certainly, Caracalla liked spending time with common soldiers, but so 
also had Pompey and Caesar. Telling is Dio’s conclusion at 78[77].11.5: ‘[He] 
made many mistakes because of the obstinacy with which he clung to his own 
opinions; for he wished not only to know everything but to be the only one to know 
anything, and he desired not only to have all power but to be the only one to have 
power’ (trans. Cary). Therefore, Dio is certainly critical, but does Dio question the 
legitimacy of Caracalla’s state or only the emperor himself? Here the popular 
acclaim of Pompey in book 36 may be worth reflecting upon. Dio similarly 
disapproves of the Pompeian method of using popular support to legitimize his 
largely-unprecedented actions to eliminate illegitimate threats (i.e. by fighting 
pirates) and corrupt ones (i.e. by co-opting the prolonged campaigns by Metellus 
and Lucullus). This disapproval is a neat parallel to his disapproval of Caracalla’s 
concessions to the soldiers and wide-scale grants of citizenship to the populace as 
means of legitimising his consolidation of authority at the partial expense of the 
aristocratic order.  Dio disapproves of Caracalla’s seeking legitimacy from the 
populace and the army, but cannot deny its effectiveness. In other words, Dio 
effectively explains that this is how Caracalla made his otherwise illegitimate 
actions legitimate, despite his scorn for the actions themselves. This may also 
explain his apparent disinterest in the salacious details in other sources — they do 
not contribute to Dio’s explanation of how emperors hold and use power.68 
The sense of legitimacy as conferred through justified actions rather than 
through what we might call objectively-appropriate actions again bring Bulla to 
mind. In equating bandit actions to imperial actions, the objective standard is cast 
                                                   
66  For example, the tyranny noted by Millar 1961:12, referring to the fragments of book 
40,  poses an interesting parallel if we do not presume Dio’s disapproval. 
67  See Davenport 2012, passim for Dio’s description of Caracalla and the Senate, and  
809-810 in particular for the illegitimacy of Caracalla’s favoured senators. It should be 
noted that this is not an argument that Caracalla was viewed positively at the time, but 
rather that there is good reason to be suspicious of the senatorial tradition given here.    
68  See Davenport 2017:93-97 for an alternate explanation. 
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aside in favour of justification. The prefect’s actions were only legitimate because 
he was the prefect; Caracalla’s acts could have been acceptable were he content to 
accept limits other emperors had. While holding the office of emperor was a de 
facto claim to legitimacy, Dio clearly outlines the other methods employed by 
emperors to claim legitimacy for themselves and its lack for their opponents. 
Personal competence and widespread (alleged) benefits for the populace rise high 
in imperial claims; we have Caracalla so arguing (78[77].3). Relation and 
succession weigh in; the pretender Avitus claims adoption by Caracalla, Severus 
claims adoption by Marcus Aurelius.69 The emperor’s predecessor is either vilified 
or deified, and damnatio memoriae becomes popular to an unprecedented degree.70  
Indeed Dio expresses shock at the way Severus treated the body of Albinus 
(76[75].7.3-4), but also acknowledges this as effective. Conversely, ambition, 
while never a negative for the successful claimant, can become excessive ambition. 
Bribery and rewards appear, successful in some cases, less so in others.71 Severus 
famously denied triumphal honours and sought to portray himself as a defender of 
the Parthian border, which may resemble the dissembling attempts of Julius Caesar 
or Augustus to put their civil wars behind them.72 
Dio seems to expect more and more power devolving to the army.73 But 
unlike other authors, Dio’s suggested reforms are not ‘return to the old ways’. 
Rather than advocate such, here he instead proposes the division of Italy and the 
subdivision of larger provinces (and the armies), as well as training the centuriate 
to deal with greater number of civil issues that had grown to accompany the 
military responsibilities.74 These are not purely reactionary moves to return to the 
past, but developments in their own right. 
                                                   
69  80[79].2 for Avitus. The retroactive adoption is mentioned as an aside in Dio at 
77[76].9.4.  See also the claims of Severus to be related to Marcus Aurelius at 76[75].7 
70  See Gleason 2011: passim, esp. 37-39 for the impact of damnatio memoriae in this 
period. 
71  Pertinax won over the soldiers (74.1), though he had some trouble finding the money 
(74.5). Caracalla sought the favour of the army through promises of money and favours 
(78.3). While donatives on succession had been standard, these appear to have been 
exceptional.   
72  For Severus, see SHA, Sev. 9, 16. For Augustus, see Dio 53.26, 54.12, 27, for the refusal 
of honours, see Dio 53.7. Kemezis 2014:61-65 also presents a useful discussion in 
seeing Severus along old Antonine lines, and see also Kemezis 2014:66-69 for his use of 
building programs.  
73  This is well noted by modern scholars. See de Blois 1998-1999:276, Scott 2018:45. 
74  See Dio 52.19-28. To what degree we should take Dio as in agreement with his literary 
Agrippa is a good question, but Dio raising the option is significant in itself. For Italy, 
see 52.22; for the provinces in general, see his mild approval of dividing provinces into 
larger numbers at 53.12-14, 59.20.7; for centurions, though it should be obvious that Dio 
also thinks this would largely be solved by having educated Greeks in these roles, see 
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Back to the mos maiorum 
Dio’s leaders of Rome are generally harsh, especially towards the Senate, starting 
even with Romulus (1.5.11): ὅτι ὁ Ῥωμύλος πρὸς τὴν γερουσίαν τραχύτερον 
διέκειτο καὶ τυραννικώτερον αὐτῇ προσεφέρετο — ‘Romulus assumed a rather 
harsh attitude toward the senate and behaved toward it much like a tyrant’ (trans. 
Cary). Dio presents the methods of successful legitimizing moves. Thus we are 
told about Pertinax (Dio 74[73].2): καὶ οὕτως ὅ τε Περτίναξ αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ ὁ 
Κόμμοδος πολέμιος ἀπεδείχθη — ‘In this way Pertinax was declared emperor and 
Commodus a public enemy’ (trans. Cary), but the accession of Julianus is marked 
by (Dio 74[73].14) Ἰουλιανὸς δὲ οὕτω τὴν ἀρχὴν ἁρπάσας ἀνελευθέρως τοῖς 
πράγμασιν ἐχρῆτο, — ‘After seizing the power in this manner’ (trans. Cary).  
In these two passages, both characters took some similar moves to consolidate their 
power and boost their legitimacy, but the latter was largely unsuccessful. A key 
difference may be here the seeking of approval from the Senate by Pertinax and 
from the Praetorian Guard by Julianus. Likewise, Avitus and Macrinus sought to 
disparage each other and buy the loyalty of soldiers (80[79].1-2). Yet, Dio’s 
recording of this rhetoric is much the same as seen in the late republic. Failure to 
achieve public consent of their legitimacy did not mean that they had not tried to 
achieve legitimacy in a typical fashion.75 To Dio’s eyes, this is not a situation 
resolvable by a return to the mos maiorum. Instead, this is what the mos maiorum 
really was all along. 
Briefly, Polybius and his theory of the anacyclosis seem apropos here, as 
Dio’s ideas about monarchy and democracy (most prominently in book 52) seem to 
be something of a response to the theories of government put forth in book six of 
Polybius, in Cicero’s De re publica, or in Aristotle’s Politics (i.e. 3.7-11).76 Dio’s 
own view of government cannot match that of Polybius or Aristotle, but it seems 
                                                                                                                     
Dio 80.7 for his opinion on centurions rising above their station). See also the analysis 
of de Blois 1984:369-370, 377. 
75  Kemezis 2014, passim but esp. at 4-8, makes a similar point here, though his argument 
is not framed in terms of legitimacy but in terms of consent and consensus. 
76  Scholarship on impact of the anacyclosis of Polybius is exhaustive. Here I may suggest 
the relatively recent contributions of Erskine and Seager in Gibson and Harrison 
2013:231-254. In any case, I think the likelihood of Dio having read Polybius is rather 
high, despite no mention of this in most discussions of Greek authors’ impact on Dio. 
(cf. Aalders 1986:292-293). Millar’s (1964:6-7) discussion of Polybius only lays out 
trends of Greek historiography, not noting whether Dio follows Polybius as well as 
Thucydides. Kemezis 2014:22f. discusses their roles as cultural commentators. Notably, 
Foulon 2016 lays out some evidence for Dio having read Polybius, though he concludes 
in the negative, as there is no certain proof of the matter. Foulon focuses more on the 
potential for use of Polybian evidence, but does touch upon the impact of Polybian 
theory (173-174). 
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likely that he was responding to the ideas therein in some way, suggesting a 
different type of cycle. Dio has no confidence that a reliance on democratic 
institutions would last long at all.77 In studying imperial legitimacy and 
illegitimacy, he does seem to observe a pattern of changes in who the emperor 
appeals to for the establishment of legitimacy and the deriding of contenders. 
Notably, he presents Sulla, Pompey, and Caesar in turn appealing to a pro-
gressively more numerous (if generally less powerful) base. Similarly, this appeal 
to a gradually broader support base seems to also reflect his depiction of the Julio-
Claudians, the Antonines, and the Severans, who consistently respond to senatorial 
disapproval with appeals to the soldiers or the general populace. Dio’s concept of 
Tyche also seems not far from that of Polybius.78 As Dio would only have used 
Polybius directly for parts of the Roman history that are now quite fragmentary, it 
is difficult to argue for direct influence of Polybius on the content. That is not a 
necessity for an argument about his theory, however. 
Dio, like Polybius, sees his historic exempla as guides for future statesmen, 
though a greater proportion of his examples are negative ones. Certainly, the idea 
that one might be successful in Rome by emulating the great men of the past was 
popular during the empire, as can be seen in Tacitus, Plutarch, and Suetonius. This 
is, of course the very basis of the idea of the mos maiorum. But Dio’s use of 
examples of challenges to imperial authority serve not to suggest a continuation of 
the customs of the Romans of old, but to suggest that the successful leaders of 
Rome are those who can tell the difference between customs to keep and customs 
to break. This is naturally a subjective view, but it is one that paints different good 
leaders of Rome, like Marcus Aurelius and Augustus not as keepers of tradition, 
but breakers of it. At the same time, it shows pragmatically that the more villainous 
emperors are often acting quite effectively when compared to their predecessors, 
not only emperors and leaders earlier in the empire, but more importantly, in the 
civil wars of the late republic. 
A few words of conclusion: Dio’s Roman history cares deeply about the 
politics of legitimacy. By studying the books on the republic, we find a concern to 
establish legitimate control over violence, which plays out in controlling the 
movement and actions of soldiers in foreign wars, grand displays to assert 
legitimate holding of power and authority in the civil wars, and appeals to the past 
as precedent in the form of the mos maiorum. Moreover, during the empire, 
competent men are kept out of power and the idea that the emperors are not shown 
                                                   
77  See Madsen 2016, for some evidence. Dio’s clearest statement about democratic and 
autocratic rule is found at 44.2. One of the characteristics of barbarians is sometimes 
that they are democratic (e.g. the Britons at 77.12). 
78  For some views on Dio’s use of tyche, see Aalders 1986:293-294. 
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to be the most competent of men is put on display by their comparison to obstacles 
such as Felix Bulla. The work also displays the emperors as keen historians of their 
imperial predecessors, albeit historians who privilege the study of retention of 
power over use of said power. Ultimately, Dio delivers an explanation for why 
incompetent imperial rule is and will continue to be standard, and the system will 
continue to deliver inferior emperors so long as the precedent-based mos maiorum 
holds strong. 
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